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Abstract
By introducing the excess burden of taxation into unionized mixed and privatized oligopolies,
we show that (i) if the government that maximizes social welfare values with a small weight of
excess burden of taxation, privatization matters regardless of the number of firms; however,
(ii) when the degree of excess burden of taxation lies within a relatively large range, the results
of both desirable privatization and nationalization materialize depending on the critical value
of the excess burden of taxation. In contrast to the existing works on mixed oligopoly, we
find privatization can enhance social welfare regardless of the number of firms, under mild
conditions.
JEL: J51, H44, L13.
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1 Introduction
The economic implications of mixed oligopoly markets have recently attracted research attention
with respect to the change in competition for the efficiency of market structure, as well as with
respect to their effects on privatization. Pioneering works by De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and
Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) on mixed oligopolies employed game-theoretic analysis of public
and private firms. Most other studies on mixed oligopoly have often assumes that the public
firm (or government) maximizes social welfare while private firms maximize their own profits.
Although some theoretical studies have succeeded in explaining a mixed duopoly, Willner
(2006), Kato and Tomaru (2007), Saha and Sensarma (2008) and Kato (2008) have explicitly
investigated different objective functions between the public firm and the government in the
mixed duopoly1. However, the government directly intervenes with some inefficiency in many
mixed markets. As Meade (1944) first pointed out, in the absence of lump-sum transfers, the
government must resort to distortionary taxes on income, capital, or consumption. In other
words, if the government raises $1, society pays $(1 + λ). The parameter λ > 0 is usually called
the shadow cost of public funds2. In the literature on mixed oligopolies, Capuano and De Feo
(2010) and Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) have tackled this issue by examining the welfare
effect of a change in a public firm’s objective function when the government takes into account
the shadow cost of public funds (or, henceforth, excess burden of taxation).
As we observed, introducing the excess burden of taxation into an endogenous timing game
in a mixed duopoly, and assuming the public firm to be less efficient than private firms, Ca-
puano and De Feo (2010) discovered that without a subsidy, private leadership emerges as more
robust. Moreover, Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) investigated optimal subsidy policy with an
†Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Busandaehak-ro 63 beon-gil
2, Geumjeong-gu, Pusan 609-735, Republic of Korea, Tel:+82-51-510-2532, Fax:+82-51-581-7144, E-mail:
choipnu@pusan.ac.kr.
1The result of different objective function between the government and the public firm in a mixed oligopoly
is a new one since so far the literature same objective function between the government and the public firm in a
mixed oligopoly has found various robust results. See also Choi (2011).
2This approach is frequently adopted in contract theory. See Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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endogenous timing game in mixed and private duopolies, considering both the excess burden
of taxation and firms’ increasing marginal cost technologies. In contrast to earlier studies on
the privatization neutrality theorem, they demonstrated that privatization affects both optimal
subsidy rate and resulting welfare. However, while they formulated that the costs of firms are
exogenous, our study considers that costs are determined via wage bargaining with the excess
burden of taxation3. Thus, we extend the analysis to a unionized mixed oligopoly and to the ef-
fects of privatization by allowing multiple private firms. To investigate an optimal privatization
policy, we incorporate union behavior into the objectives of the government, with the excess
burden of taxation to explain the government’s incentive for privatization as a commitment
device.
On the issue of unions’ wage setting, the results correspond to the empirical findings that
in Europe, Japan, and the United States, the government is heavily involved in the setting of
public sector wages (Du Caju et al., 2008). Moreover, Bordogna (2003, pp. 62-63) pointed
out that “even where bargaining has been decentralized, governments have often maintained
strong, centralized, financial controls in order to contain public expenditures and avoid infla-
tionary consequences of the decentralization process.” Thus, the issue remaining to be analyzed
is whether the above results are robust to changes in the type of competition under unionized
mixed oligopoly with excess burden of taxation4. As Bordogna (2003) argued, the empirical
facts reveal that unions’ wage setting under unionized mixed oligopoly is a better approach to
tackle this problem, as opposed to competition in the product market. This is why unions’
strategic behavior under unionized mixed oligopoly is considered in this paper.
In this paper, following Capuano and De Feo (2010) and Matsumura and Tomaru (2013),
we examine whether privatization is desirable with unions’ strategic behavior when the excess
burden of taxation is introduced in the government’s objective function. To study the welfare
effect of a change in the government’s objective function in a mixed oligopoly, we allow for
multiple private firms in the mixed oligopoly setting, rather than the mixed duopoly framework
used Capuano and De Feo (2010) and Matsumura and Tomaru (2013). Here, according to our
results under general formulation, we remark that there may be limitations in assuming a mixed
duopoly when there exists the excess burden of taxation. Consequently, we show that regardless
of the number of existing firms, the government’s incentive to privatize the public firm always
exists when the degree of excess burden of taxation is relatively small, and vice versa when the
degree of excess burden of taxation is relatively large.
More specifically, regardless of the number of private firms, the privatization of a public firm
is always desirable from the welfare point of view when the degree of excess burden of taxation
falls within a small range, that is, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Because of the existence of unions, social welfare
3In the presence of the excess burden of taxation, Wang and Chen (2011) found for an imposition of the
optimal subsidy, the level of welfare with privatization depends on the level of the cost efficiency gap and the
excess burden of taxation. This is because they assumed that the public firm is less inefficient than the private
firms.
4In addition, according to Lewin (1977, p. 140), “an additional shortcoming of the ‘union power’ thesis with
respect to the governmental sector is its de-emphasis, even ignorance, of conditions that make for potentially
diverse patterns of labor relations.” In fact, this growing importance of the public sector in terms of union
membership suggests that a more complete understanding of the role of unions in wage determination requires a
better understanding of their role in the public sector (Bahrami et al., 2009, p. 35). See, among others, De Fraja
(1993a) and Haskel and Sanchis (1995) for theoretical view.
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under either mixed oligopoly or privatization consists of two factors in a reduced form: the
representative consumer’s utility and the profit of the public or privatized firm. Thus, on the
one hand, when the excess burden of taxation is sufficiently small, it forces the public firm’s
profit to be negative, while the privatized firm’s profit is independent of the excess burden of
taxation, which emerges as a positive welfare effect of privatization. On the other hand, (the
representative) consumer’s utility may be higher under mixed oligopoly than under privatization
when the excess burden of taxation is sufficiently small. The excess burden of taxation with
public funding costs reduces the public firm’s profit and, increases the representative consumer’s
utility as this burden increases under privatization, given the number of firms, and as privati-
zation induces production substitution from the public firm to private firms. The latter two
effects under privatization increase welfare, whereas the first effect reduces welfare under mixed
oligopoly. For this reason, the government uses total wage as a commitment device to control
the unions’ wage demands to maintain lower total wage levels under privatization. A decrease
in the wages works to improve welfare by increasing the total output under privatization.
When the degree of the excess burden of taxation falls within a large range, that is, λ > 1, the
result of both desirable privatization and nationalization materialize depending on the critical
value of the excess burden of taxation. Given that λ > 1, privatization stimulates total output
and consumer’s utility under privatization starts to increase. However, after reaching the critical
value of the excess burden of taxation, it is dominated by the excess burden effect; and vice
versa when the degree of the excess burden of taxation becomes small, given the number of firms.
Contrary to the first result, the government may or may not use total wage as a commitment
device to control the unions’ wage demands to maintain lower total wage levels since higher wages
are still maintained under mixed oligopoly when the degree of the excess burden of taxation is
sufficiently great.
The main result of our paper is in contrast to the findings of De Fraja and Delbono (1989)
regarding mixed oligopoly that privatization can enhance social welfare when the number of
existing private firms is relatively large; this finding holds when the effect of excess burden
of taxation does not exist. Moreover, our result is crucial to the evaluation of the impact of
welfare subsequent to privatization of the public firm to maximize profits. In fact, comparing
the privatization with mixed duopoly, Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) argue that privatization
reduces welfare when the effect of excess burden of taxation exists under the government’s
tax-subsidy policies. However, their study does not consider the situation in which the public
firm competes with multiple private firms without tax-subsidy policies, and hence, the result
that mixed oligopoly reduces welfare does not hold, even with the excess burden of taxation.
With the excess burden of taxation, Capuano and De Feo (2010) found under mixed duopoly,
privatization is not desirable when assuming that the public firm is less efficient than private
firms, which differs from our main result.
2 The Model
Consider a mixed oligopoly situation for a homogeneous good that is supplied by a public firm
(indexed by 0) and n private firms. Firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is a profit-maximizing private firm,
and firm 0 is a public firm that maximizes social welfare. On the demand side of the market,
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we assume that the representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function given by
U = x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi − (x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
2
; i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where x0 is the level of output of the public firm, and xi is the level of output of the i
th private
firm (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Thus, the inverse demand is characterized by
p = 1− x0 −
n∑
i=1
xi; i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where p is the market price.
To analyze the union’s wage bargaining, we also assume that the public and private firms are
unionized and that the wages, wj : j = 0, 1, ..., n, are determined as a consequence of bargaining
between firms and their respective unions. Let w and Lj denote the reservation wage and the
number of workers who are employed by firm j, respectively. The firms are homogeneous with
respect to productivity. Each firm adopts a constant returns-to-scale technology where one unit
of labor is turned into one unit of the final good; thus, xj = Lj . Taking w as a given, the union’s
optimal wage-setting strategy regarding firm j, wj , is defined as
max
wj
uj = (wj − w)θLj ; j = 0, 1, ..., n,
where θ is the weight that the union attaches to the wage level. Following Ishida and Matsushima
(2009) in the literature on the unionized mixed duopoly, we assume that θ = 1 and w = 0 to
demonstrate our results simply. That is, the utility function of the union at the firm is its wage
bill: uj(wj ;Lj) = wjLj = wjxj . Thus, we consider the monopoly union model, which assumes
that the unions set the wage while the firms choose the employment level once the wage is set
by unions (see also Booth, 1995)5.
Each firm’s profit is as following function
pij = (p− wj)xj , j = 0, 1, ..., n, (1)
where the price of labor (i.e., wage) that firm j has to pay is denoted by wj , j = 0, 1, ..., n.
We assume that the public firm maximizes a utilitarian measure of welfare taking into account
the excess burden of taxation. That is, let λ > 0 denote the excess burden of taxation, which
implies that distortionary taxation inflicts disutility $(1 + λ) on taxpayers in order to levy $1
for the state. To compute the real cost incurred by a firm, the firm’s cost and revenue are
multiplied by 1 + λ. This parameter is a measure of the dead-weight loss due to distortionary
taxation. Then, in the presence of the excess burden of taxation, the maximization problem of
5As Ishida and Matsushima (2009) and Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2009) have suggested, this is because wage
claims are decided by the elasticity of labor demand rather than the firm’s profit. As a special case of the
Nash bargaining solution, the monopoly union model is frequently adopted; see also Oswald and Turnbull (1985).
On the other hand, adopting the asymmetric Nash bargaining, De Fraja (1993b) assumed that the public firm
maximizes the weight of sum consumer surplus, profit and the union’s utility. The weight attached to the union’s
utility assumed to be exogenously given. However, it is hard to obtain explicit solution due to the asymmetric
Nash bargaining under the unionized mixed oligopoly.
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the government is given by
SW = U − p(x0 +
n∑
i=1
xi) +
n∑
i=1
(pii + ui) + u0 + (1 + λ)pi0, (2)
where λ represents the unit of excess burden6, U − p(x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi) is consumer surplus, each
firm pii and pi0 is the profit of the private and public firm, and uj is the union’s utility of both
the private and public firm.
Timing of the three-stage game is as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses
whether or not to privatize the public firm. In the second stage, each firm’s union negotiates
over wages. In the third stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its quantity to maximize its
respective objective knowing each union’s choice of the wage level.
3 The Market Equilibrium
Before comparing social welfare under the unionized mixed oligopoly with social welfare under
the privatization, we first consider all firms’ maximization problems. In this paper, since we focus
on symmetric Nash equilibrium, we assume that all firms choose the same type of bargaining.
Thus, the game is solved by backward induction, i.e., the solution concept used is the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.1 The Unionized Mixed Oligopoly
In the third stage, given wj for each firm, the public firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x0
SW = U + λpi0.
Given wage level wj in the third stage, the best-reply functions of the public and private firms
are derived, as usual, from the first order condition:
∂SW
∂x0
= 0⇔ x0 = (1 + λ)(1− nxi)− λw0
1 + 2λ
,
∂pii
∂xi
= 0⇔ xi = 1− wi − x0
n+ 1
. (3)
Solving the first-order conditions (3), we obtain,
x0 =
(1 + λ)(1 + nwi)− λ(1 + n)w0
1 + λ(n+ 2)
, xi =
λ(1 + w0)− (1 + 2λ)wi
1 + λ(n+ 2)
. (4)
In the second stage of this case, each wage is set to maximize its firm’s union utility: Uj = xjwj .
To do this, the two independent maximization problems should be considered simultaneously.
Using (4), the problem for union j = 0, 1, ..., n is defined as
max
w0
u0 =
w0[(1 + λ)(1 + nwi)− λ(1 + n)w0]
1 + λ(n+ 2)
, max
wi
ui =
wi[λ(1 + w0)− (1 + 2λ)wi]
1 + λ(n+ 2)
.
6Usually, it is assumed that λ > 0. Since λ is a measure of the distortion by taxation, we may be comfortable
assuming that λ ∈ [0, 1] which reflects more reality. In Baron and Myerson (1982) regulation model, the principal
is a regulator who maximizes social welfare with a weight α < 1 for the firm. Since α < 1, it is socially costly to
give a rent to the firm. However, Capuano and De Feo (2010) assume that λ has some higher-bound restriction.
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Solving these problems and noting that superscript “m” denotes the optimal solution in a union-
ized mixed oligopoly, we have the following result.
Lemma 1: Suppose λ > 0. Then, the equilibrium wage, output, union’s utility, the profit of
private firms and social welfare are given by
wm0 =
(1 + λ)[2 + λ(4 + n)]
λ[4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]
, xm0 =
(1 + n)[2 + λ(10 + n) + λ2(16 + 3n) + λ3(8 + 2n)]
(1 + 2λ)[1 + λ(n+ 2)][4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]
;
wmi =
1 + λ(5 + 2n) + λ2(6 + 4n)
(1 + 2λ)[4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]
, xmi =
1 + λ(7 + 2n) + λ2(16 + 8n) + λ3(12 + 8n)
(1 + 2λ)[1 + λ(n+ 2)][4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]
;
um0 =
(1 + n)(1 + λ)[2 + λ(4 + n)][2 + λ(10 + n) + λ2(16 + 3n) + λ3(8 + 2n)]
λ(1 + 2λ)[1 + λ(n+ 2)][4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]2
;
umi =
[1 + λ(5 + 2n) + λ2(6 + 4n)][1 + λ(7 + 2n) + λ2(16 + 8n) + λ3(12 + 8n)]
(1 + 2λ)2[1 + λ(n+ 2)][4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]2
;
pimi =
[1 + λ(7 + 2n) + λ2(16 + 8n) + λ3(12 + 8n)]2
(1 + 2λ)2[1 + λ(n+ 2)]2[4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]2
;
SWm =
4 + 16n+ 9n2 + λA+ λ2B + λ3C + λ4D + λ5E + λ6F + λ7G
2(1 + 2λ)2[1 + λ(2 + n)]2[4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]2
,
where A = 48 + 204n+ 146n2 + 18n3, B = 244 + 1088n+ 934n2 + 206n3 + 9n4;
C =680 + 3124n+ 3088n2 + 934n3 + 76n4, D = 1120 + 5152n+ 5665n2 + 2110n3 + 241n4;
E =1088 + 4768n+ 5606n2 + 2404n3 + 342n4, F = 576 + 2176n+ 2540n2 + 1160n3 + 188n4;
G =128 + 320n+ 264n2 + 80n3 + 8n4.
3.2 The Unionized Privatized Oligopoly
The previous subsection examined the impact of a unionized mixed oligopoly. This subsection
compares the equilibrium of a unionized mixed oligopoly, which would be established in the
case of a unionized privatized oligopoly. As discussed in the basic model, consider the situation
of a privatized oligopoly for a homogeneous good that is supplied by firm (k = 1, 2, ..., n + 1),
which is a profit-maximizing private firm given that a new inverse demand is characterized by
p = 1−∑n+1k=1 : n ≥ 1. After privatization, as in Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) and Wang and
Chen (2011), social welfare is given by
SW = U − px0 −
n∑
k=1
pxk + (1 + λ)R+ u0 + (pi0 −R) +
n∑
k=1
(pik + uk), (5)
where R is the revenue from selling the stocks of public firm 0, u0 is the union under selling the
stocks of public firm 0 (i.e., privatized firm), and U − px0 −
∑n
k=1 pxk is consumer surplus. As
Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) and Wang and Chen (2011) assumed, we consider the case in
where R = pi0 = pin+1 since the financial market is complete
7. Thus, SW = U+λpin+1 = U+λpik.
7As Capuano and De Feo (2010) pointed out, we give full bargaining power to the government, i.e., it is able
to extract the whole profit from the privatized firm.
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In the third stage, the firm k’s profit-maximization problem is to maximize pik = (p−wk)xk.
Hence, solving across the n + 1 first-order conditions, the n + 1 best reply functions can be
rewritten as follows:
xk =
1− (n+ 1)wk + nwl
2 + n
, k 6= l; k, l = 1, 2, ..., n+ 1. (6)
In the second stage, given the output as a function of wage, each union at each firm sets the
wage, wk, that maximizes union rent, uk. Thus, similar to the unionized mixed oligopoly in
previous section, we have the following result as given, superscript “ ∗ ” denotes the optimal
solution under the unionized privatized oligopoly:
Lemma 2: Suppose λ > 0. Then, the equilibrium wage, output, union’s utility, social welfare
and the profit of private firms are given by
w∗k =
1
2 + n
, x∗k =
1 + n
(2 + n)2
, u∗k =
1 + n
(2 + n)3
,
SW ∗ =
(1 + n)2(7 + 6n+ n2 + 2λ)
2(2 + n)4
, pi∗k =
(1 + n)2
(2 + n)4
.
4 Comparisons of Equilibrium Outcomes
Having derived the market equilibrium for the fixed situation in the previous section, we will
find Nash equilibrium in the first stage for any given set of utilities of the unions and the profits
of firms in both unionized mixed and privatized oligopolies.
First, we observe a result with λ = 0 as a benchmark.
Result 1: Suppose that λ = 0. Then, SWm < SW ∗.
Proof: Comparing the unionized mixed oligopoly with privatization when λ = 0, straightfor-
ward computations show that
SWm − SW ∗ = −48− 104n− 111n2 − 84n3 − 40n4 − 8n5 − 9n6 < 0. Q.E.D.
Result 1 indicates that regardless of the number of existing firms, social welfare under privatiza-
tion is greater than under the unionized mixed oligopoly. This implies that if the public firm’s
union aims at maximizing wage level and it does not face some budget constraint with a simple
union function uj = wjxj , the public firm’s union can unlimitedly raise its wage because the
optimal output level of the public firm is independent of the wage (see Ishida and Matsushima,
2009).
We now present our main proposition as follows.
Proposition 1: Suppose that λ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, SWm < SW ∗.
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Proof: See the appendix with Table A-1 and Figure A-1 for more detailed examples. Comparing
the mixed oligopoly with privatization when λ ∈ (0, 1], straightforward computations show that
SWm − SW ∗ = −48− 104n− 111n2 − 84n3 − 40n4 − 8n5 − 9n6
− λ(608 + 1448n+ 1664n2 + 1306n3 + 676n4 + 180n5 + 16n6)
− λ2(4010 + 8208n+ 6195n2 + 8344n3 + 4619n4 + 1488n5 + 223n6 + 2602n7)
− λ3(9040 + 25056n+ 32458n2 + 28074n3 + 18486n4 + 6064n5 + 1202n6 + 100n7 + 2n8)
− λ4(14080 + 39368n+ 59328n2 + 52632n3 + 32295n4 + 12994n5 + 3071n6 + 350n7 + 12n8)
− λ5(11776 + 38272n+ 54009n2 + 52544n3 + 32734n4 + 13676n5 + 3540n6 + 3396n7 + 22n8)
− λ6(4096 + 14848n+ 24040n2 + 22560n3 + 12916n4 + 4560n5 + 1004n6 + 216n7 + 4n8)
− λ7(512n+ 1440n2 + 992n3 − 728n4 − 1360n5 − 704n6 − 72n7 − 8n8) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 suggests that regardless of the number of private firms, the privatization of a
public firm is always desirable from a welfare point of view when λ ∈ (0, 1]. This proposition
is different from the corresponding result of De Fraja and Delbono (1989), who found that the
privatization of the public firm is desirable in terms of social welfare when the number of private
firms is large, and is not desirable when the number of private firms is small.
The following is the intuition behind proposition 1. When comparing welfare before and after
the change in the public firm’s objective function, the profits of the public firm and privatized
firm do matter, that is, while comparing social welfare of reduced form, SWm = Um + λpim0
under the mixed oligopoly with its reduced form, SW ∗ = U∗ + λpi∗k under privatization. The
government confronts two effects when it privatizes its public firm. One, the excess burden of
taxation forces the public firm’s profit to be negative8 when λ ∈ (0, 1], while the privatized
firm’s profit is independent of the excess burden of taxation, which is a positive welfare effect
of privatization. We call this effect the “excess burden effect.” The other effect is that the
representative consumer’s utility may be higher under mixed oligopoly than under privatization
when λ ∈ (0, 1]. This is a positive welfare effect of nationalization9. To compare the excess
burden effect with this effect, we call as it the “consumer effect.” The excess burden effect
reduces the public firm’s profit when λ ∈ (0, 1], and increases the representative consumer’s
utility as λ increases under privatization given the number of firms. Privatization, in turn,
induces production substitution from the public firm to the private firms. The latter two effects
increase welfare whereas the first effect reduces welfare. This explanation implies that the
consumer effect plus the excess burden effect under privatization dominates the effects obtained
under mixed oligopoly. That is, the excess burden effect is weaker because of the negative profit
of the public firm, while the consumer effect is stronger when λ is larger, given the number of
firms. For this reason, the government uses total wage as a commitment device to control the
unions’ wage demands so as to maintain lower total wage levels under privatization10. Thus,
8The calculation of the profit of the public firm is relegated to the appendix. However, when λ is sufficiently
large (i.e., λ > 1), its profit may be either positive or negative depending on the critical value of λ. See appendix
A-3 and A-4 for more detailed calculations.
9See the appendix A-5 and A-6 for each comparison of representative consumer’s utility and total output.
Precisely speaking, there can exist a critical value of λU such that for all λ > (resp. <)λU given λ ∈ (0, 1], we
obtain the difference as Um < (resp. >)U∗ except for n = 1.
10When comparing total wage, we obtain (nwmi +w
m
0 )− (n+ 1)w∗k = 4 + 2n+ λ(16 + 7n− n2) + λ2(16 + 3n−
8
lower total wages under privatization work to improve welfare by increasing total output. This
may lead to more output under privatization than under a unionized mixed oligopoly when
λ ∈ (0, 1], given that the number of existing firms increases.
However, we should not overemphasize the result that privatization increases welfare. Priva-
tization can be harmful in alternative model formulations. For example, if the public firm faces
some budget constraints (an issue ignored in this paper) with a simple union function when the
union aims at maximizing wage level, the obtained welfare gain can dominate the welfare gain
discussed above with the excess burden of taxation.
On the other hand, the welfare ranking may be reversed when λ is sufficiently large (i.e.,
when λ > 1). Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose that λ > 1. Then,
(i) there can exist a critical value of λ† such that for all λ ≥ λ† and n ≥ 2, we obtain the
difference as SWm ≥ SW ∗ and for all λ < λ†, as SWm < SW ∗.
(ii) when n = 1, we obtain the difference as SWm < SW ∗ regardless of λ.
Proof: See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 suggests that depending on the range of the excess burden of taxation, withλ > 1
and n > 1, social welfare is determined under either mixed oligopoly or privatization11.
Upon recalling welfare of the reduced form, SWm = Um + λpim0 under the mixed oligopoly
with SW ∗ = U∗+λpi∗k under privatization, the welfare rankings in proposition 2 become intuitive.
When λ > 1, the improvement of social welfare under mixed oligopoly is possible since the excess
burden effect dominates the consumer effect under privatization when λ ≥ λ† and n ≥ 2. This
implies that if the degree of the excess burden of taxation is smaller than that of its critical value,
the total output level under mixed oligopoly may be smaller than that under privatization, and
vice versa (see the appendix on the public firm’s profit and comparison of total output). In other
words, given the number of firms, the result of both desirable privatization and nationalization
emerge depending on the excess burden of taxation. If λ < λ†, privatization stimulates total
output, hence the consumer effect under the privatization starts to become stronger; however,
with λ > λ†, it is dominated by an excess burden effect, and vice versa if the degree of the
excess burden of taxation becomes small with a small number of firms12. Consequently, we
obtain proposition 2 depending on λ†. Whether or not privatization improves welfare depends
on which effect is stronger. As pointed out in proposition 1, higher wages are still maintained
under mixed oligopoly when λ > λ†, whereas the excess burden effect starts to dominate the
consumer effect. Maintaining higher wage reduces welfare since wages are strategic complements
between the unions, whereas the excess burden effect improves welfare even with a higher wages
n2 + 2n3)− λ3(6n− 2n2 − 4n3). On the other hand, wmi − w∗k = −(1 + n)− λ(3 + 2n− n2)− λ2(2− 2n2).
11For simplicity of explanation, we exclude the case of n = 1.
12If we adopt the increasing marginal costs without union, it would similar results to proposition 2, except for
the case, n = 1, 2. The detailed computations are available from author upon request. To provide correct proofs,
we present on Supplemental Material of separate page, which is only available for the reviewers and editors.
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level under mixed oligopoly, and vice versa if λ < λ†. This result turns out that when λ > λ†,
the government may not use total wage as a commitment device to control the unions’ wage
demands to maintain lower total wage levels under mixed oligopoly. This is because the excess
burden effect under mixed oligopoly dominates consumer effect under privatization. However,
when λ < λ†, it can use total wage as a commitment device to control lower wage level under
privatization, which also works to improve welfare under privatization by increasing the total
output.
In sum, propositions 1 and 2 are in sharp contrast to the existing literature that shows that
the privatization of the public firm is desirable from the welfare point of view with a relatively
large number of firms (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989). With both the excess burden of taxation
and firms’ endogenous cost via wage bargaining, the intuition of propositions 1 and 2 relies on
the different effects exerted by the representative consumer’s utility and the profit of firms.
Comparing privatization with mixed duopoly, Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) investigated
optimal tax-subsidy policies with the excess burden of taxation. They focused on both the
optimal tax-subsidy policies with endogenous timing of production, as well as the privatization
neutrality theorem. However, their study does not extend to the situation in which the public
firm competes with multiple private firms; hence, the result that mixed oligopoly reduces welfare
does not hold even with the excess burden of taxation. Moreover, Capuano and De Feo (2010)
demonstrated that with nil or large efficiency gains, an inefficient public firm that maximizes
welfare may still be preferred when there exists the excess burden of taxation in the government’s
objective function, which is different from our results.
5 Concluding Remarks
By introducing the excess burden of taxation into a theoretical framework of unionized mixed
oligopoly, this study provides new insight into social welfare within the context of the gov-
ernment’s optimal policy in respect to privatization. When λ ∈ [0, 1], privatization matters
regardless of the number of firms. However, we show that depending on the range of the excess
burden of taxation, social welfare is determined under either the mixed oligopoly or privati-
zation. In this paper, we suggest that under mild conditions, privatization is considered as
a powerful instrument to reduce distortionary taxation. However, we show that an inefficient
public firm may be preferred even when large inefficiency exists.
We conclude by discussing the limitations of our paper. We have used the simplifying assump-
tion that private and public firms are symmetric due to a decentralized unionization structure
with the monopoly union model. By making these assumptions, we do not take into account
any cost difference that may arise from the mixed bargaining that occurs between private and
public firms. Moreover, in this paper, it is assumed that the public firm is as efficient as the
private firm with endogenous input costs (i.e., wages). If the cost between the public and private
firms is characterized by increasing and decreasing return to scale, privatization may reduce or
improve welfare with the different degree of the excess burden of taxation. Finally, we have not
extended the model to consider a situation in which the public firm competes with both domes-
tic and foreign private firms. An extension of our model in these directions is for future research.
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Appendix
A-1. Proof of Proposition 1
Since the comparison of each social welfare becomes complicated when λ ∈ (0, 1], we need to use
the plot of the expressions to illustrate the impact of both degree of excess burden of taxation
and the number of firms. When λ ∈ (0, 1], the comparison of SWm − SW ∗ over the parameter
space {λ, n} is drawn in Figure A-1.
Figure A-1. λ ∈ (0, 1] and n ∈ [1, 100] when comparing SWm − SW ∗
At the same time, using computations, the numerical analysis of Table A-1 shows each compar-
ison of each social welfare.
Table A-1: The number of firms, n with λ ∈ (0, 1] when comparing SWm − SW ∗
SWm − SW ∗
λ n = 1 n = 2 · · · n = 20 · · · n = 100 · · ·
0.01 -466 -3285 · · · -961241000 · · · -35339512327988 · · ·
0.1 -1494 -13683 · · · -34715577801 · · · -2668026079752860 · · ·
0.3 -10944 -115272 · · · -331139498144 · · · -26974707984645500 · · ·
0.5 -48597 -496448 · · · -1102889086549 · · · -96818001098310800 · · ·
0.7 -159964 -1594375 · · · -2876166087553 · · · -271145850436360000 · · ·
0.9 -431732 -4241945 · · · -6715644736526 · · · -661425626287401000 · · ·
1 -670888 -6555758 · · · -9929988665978 · · · -987947372141275000 · · ·
? The negative number in each cell depicts that given the degree of λ ∈ (0, 1], the comparisons of social
welfare imply SWm < SW ∗. Noting that for simplicity, we omit the decimal place of numbers in each
cell, for given the number of firms, n ≥ 1 and the range, λ ∈ (0, 1].
Q.E.D.
A-2. Proof of Proposition 2
Comparing the mixed oligopoly with privatization when λ > 1, straightforward computations
show that
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Table A-2: The number of firms, n with λ > 1 when comparing SWm − SW ∗
SWm − SW ∗
λ n = 1 n = 2 · · · n = 50 · · · n = 100 · · ·
1.1 -1011485 -9833240 · · · -9482371797544900 · · · -1148552807110180000 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
3.05 -145710984 -1192542221
. . . -37760645429656600
. . . -243295558949306×103 · · ·
3.06 -148254833 -1211866018
. . . -37807348191996300
. . . 110123177065542×104 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
3.66 -385863468 -2913691186
. . . -2513007070883840
. . . 219525485483227×106 . . .
3.67 -391585186 -2952733915
. . . 14394729944189400 · · · 226530012745852×106 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
10.35 -132005813464 -827463827
. . . 398248980231828×107 . . . 972766339437254×109 . . .
10.36 -132744421843 681870899
. . . 401076409416575×109 . . . 979574899358374×109 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
? The positive (negative) number in each cell depicts that given the degree of λ > 1, the comparisons of
social welfare imply SWm > (<)SW ∗. Noting that for simplicity, we omit the decimal place of numbers
in each cell, for given the number of firms, n ≥ 1 and the range, λ > 1.
Since the comparison of each social welfare becomes complicated when λ > 1, for example, the
comparison of SWm − SW ∗ over the parameter space {λ, n} is drawn in Figure A-2.
Figure A-2. λ ∈ (1, 4] and n ∈ [1, 100] when comparing SWm − SW ∗
Q.E.D.
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A-3. The Profit of Public Firm
λpim0 =
−8− 8n− λA− λ2B − λ3C − λ4D − λ5E + λ6F + λ7G
2(1 + 2λ)2[1 + λ(2 + n)]2[4 + 3n+ λ(8 + 7n)]2
;
where A = 88 + 104n+ 16n3, B = 392 + 528n+ 146n2 + 10n3;
C = 888 + 1320n+ 494n2 + 64n3 + 2n4, D = 1024 + 1608n+ 706n2 + 130n3 + 8n4;
E = 448 + 624n+ 222n2 + 52n3 + 6n4, F = 128 + 416n+ 384n2 + 104n3 + 8n4;
G = 128 + 320n+ 264n2 + 80n3 + 8n4.
A-4. Comparison of Firm’s Profit
λpim0 − λpi∗k = −64− 192n− 224n2 − 128n3 − 36n4 − 4n5
− λ(720 + 2296n+ 2921n2 + 1892n3 + 661n4 + 116n5 + 8n6)
− λ2(3328 + 11208n+ 15300n2 + 10990n3 + 4418n4 + 986n5 + 113n6 + 5n7)
− λ3(8064 + 28528n+ 41481n2 + 32090n3 + 14246n4 + 2978n5 + 563n6 + 40n7 + n8)
− λ4(10752 + 39808n+ 60968n2 + 49914n3 + 23488n4 + 6490n5 + 1047n6 + 97n7 + 4n8)
− λ5(7424 + 28800n+ 46168n2 + 39116n3 + 18517n4 + 4790n5 + 664n6 + 50n7 + 3n8)
− λ6(2048 + 8576n+ 24528n2 + 12248n3 + 4828n4 + 320n5 + 340n6 − 84n7 − 4n8)
− λ7(256n+ 720n2 + 496n3 − 364n4 − 680n5 − 352n6 − 72n7 − 4n8).
As in Tables A-1 and A-2, equation, λpim0 − λpi∗k has similar results in each cell when λ ∈ (0, 1]
and λ > 1.
A-5. Comparison of Total Output
Xm(≡ nxmi + xm0 ))−X∗(≡ (1 + n)x∗k) = 4 + 9n+ 4n2 + λ(16 + 41n+ 21n2 + n3)
+ λ2(16 + 52n+ 27n2 − 3n3 − 2n4) + λ3(12n+ 2n2 − 10n3 − 4n4).
A-6. Comparison of Representative Consumer’s Utility
Um − U∗ = 80 + 280n+ 337n2 + 172n3 + 32n4
+ λ(1372 + 3144n+ 4718n2 + 2490n3 + 648n4 + 52n5)
+ λ2(3456 + 14208n+ 20465n2 + 13636n3 + 4217n4 + 304n5 + 3n6)
+ λ3(7168 + 32000n+ 50104n2 + 35964n3 + 11686n4 + 1036n5 − 210n6 − 30n7)
+ λ4(7424 + 37248n+ 62808n2 + 47196n3 + 14781n4 − 20n5 − 977n6 − 156n7 − 4n8)
+ λ5(3072 + 19328n+ 38327n2 + 14628n3 + 4320n4 − 17096n5 − 2252n6 − 3296n7 − 16n8)
+ λ6(2304n+ 5016n2 + 1936n3 − 3260n4 − 3920n5 − 1684n6 − 384n7 − 12n8).
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S1. The Model: Increasing Marginal Costs without Union
Consider a mixed oligopoly situation for a homogeneous good that is supplied by a public firm
(indexed by 0) and n private firms. Firm i (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is a profit-maximizing private firm,
and firm 0 is a public firm that maximizes social welfare. Assume that the inverse demand is
characterized by p = 1− x0 −
∑n
i=1 xi, where p is the market price, x0 is the level of output of
the public firm, and xi is the level of output of the i
th private firm (i = 1, 2, ..., n).
Given that each firm shares the same production technology that is represented by a quadratic
cost function
x2j
2 , j = 0, 1, ..., n, each firm’s profit is as shown in
pij = pxj −
x2j
2
, j = 0, 1, ..., n. (S-1)
where marginal cost is increasing marginal cost.
As in main text, we assume that the public firm maximizes a utilitarian measure of welfare
taking into account the shadow cost of public funds. Thus, the maximization problem of the
government is given by
SW =
(x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
2
+
n∑
i=1
pii + (1 + λ)pi0, (S-2)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] represents the unit of excess burden13, (x0+
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
2 is consumer surplus, each
firm pii and pi0 is the profit of the private and public firm.
Timing of the two-stage game is as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses whether
or not to privatize the public firm. In the second stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its
quantity to maximize its respective objective knowing type of competition.
S2. The Market Equilibrium
S2-1. The Mixed Oligopoly
For this purpose, we consider two competition regimes: mixed oligopoly, and privatization. To
derive the reaction functions of both the public and the private firms, differentiating (S-1) and
(S-2) with x0 and xi, respectively, we have
∂SW
∂x0
= 0⇔ x0 = (1 + λ)(1− nxi)
2 + 3λ
,
∂pii
∂xi
= 0⇔ xi = 1− x0
2 + n
. (S-3)
13We do not assume that λ > 1, since its assumption makes always the mixed oligopoly to be preferred rather
than the privatization. We will mention later this reason in the proof of proposition S1.
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Solving the first-order conditions (S-3), we obtain,
x0 =
2(1 + λ)
4 + n+ 2λ(3 + n)
, xi =
1 + 2λ
4 + n+ 2λ(3 + n)
.
Using each optimal output, we have the following result.
Lemma S1: Suppose that λ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the equilibrium profits of private and public firms
and social welfare are given by
pimi =
3(1 + 2λ)2
2[4 + n+ 2λ(3 + n)]2
, pim0 =
2(1 + λ)(1 + 3λ)
[4 + n+ 2λ(3 + n)]2
;
SWm =
8 + 7n+ n2 + λ(28 + 24n+ 4n2) + λ2(32 + 20n+ 4n2) + 12λ3
2[4 + n+ 2λ(3 + n)]2
.
S2-2. The Privatization
The previous subsection examined the impact of a mixed oligopoly. This subsection compares
the equilibrium of a mixed oligopoly, which would be established in the case of a privatized
oligopoly. As discussed in the basic model, consider the situation of a privatized oligopoly for
a homogeneous good that is supplied by firm (k = 1, 2, ..., n + 1), which is a profit-maximizing
private firm given that a new inverse demand is characterized by p = 1−∑n+1k=1 : n ≥ 1.
In the second stage, the firm k’s profit-maximization problem is to maximize pik = pxk− x
2
k
2 .
Hence, solving across the n + 1 first-order conditions, the n + 1 best reply functions can be
rewritten as follows:
xk =
1
3 + n
, k = 1, 2, ..., n+ 1.
After privatization, as in main text, social welfare is given by
SW =
(
∑n+1
k=1 xk)
2
2
+
n∑
k=1
pik + (pi
p
0 −R) + (1 + λ)R.
Using each optimal output, we have the following result.
Lemma S2: Suppose that λ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the equilibrium profit of private firm and social
welfare are given by
pi∗k =
3
2(3 + n)2
, SW ∗ =
4 + 5n+ n2 + 3λ
2(3 + n)2
.
S3. Comparisons of Equilibrium Outcomes
Having derived the equilibrium for fixed situation in the previous section, we will find the Nash
equilibrium in the first stage for any given the profits of firms in both mixed and privatized
oligopolies. Note that we do not assume that λ > 1, since its assumption makes always the
mixed oligopoly to be preferred rather than the privatization.
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We obtain proposition as follows.
Proposition S1: Suppose that λ ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
(i) there can exist a critical value of λ∗ such that for all λ ≥ λ∗ and n ≥ 3, we obtain the
difference as SWm ≥ SW ∗ and for all λ < λ∗, as SWm > SW ∗.
(ii) when n = 1 and n = 2, we obtain the difference as SWm < SW ∗ regardless of λ.
(iii) when λ = 1, we obtain the difference as SWm > SW ∗ regardless of n.
Proof: Comparing both the case of mixed oligopoly with privatization when λ ∈ (0, 1], straight-
forward computations show that
SWm − SW ∗ = 8− n− n2 + λ(12 + 8n+ n2) + λ2(12n+ 4n2). (S-4)
By directly applying the above equation to a discriminant when comparing SWm − SW ∗, the
minimum value is attained because (12n+ 4n2) > 0 with n ≥ 1, then the graph of SWm−SW ∗
is a U shaped. Table S-1 gives two roots when comparing each social welfare.
Table S-1: Roots for λ with the number of firms, n
SWm − SW ∗
n λ1 λ
∗
1 -0.892182326 -0.420317674
2 -0.731662479 -0.068337521
3 -0.703922796 0.078922796
...
...
...
30 -0.649424096 0.358515005
...
...
...
150 -0.642302046 0.384001393
...
...
...
5000 -0.640446479 0.390196509
...
...
...
Therefore, we know the points λ∗ and λ1 at which the graph of SWm − SW ∗ intersects the
horizontal axis with n ≥ 1. However, since we can ignore the negative points, λ1 by the
assumption λ ∈ (0, 1], there can exist a critical value such that for all λ ≥ λ∗ when n ≥ 3, we
obtain SWm ≥ SW ∗, and for all λ < λ∗ as SWm < SW ∗. Since we assume that λ ∈ (0, 1],
we obtain SWm > SW ∗ when n = 1, 2. Finally, substituting λ ≥ 1 into Eq. (S-4) yields
SWm > SW ∗ regardless of n.
Q.E.D.
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